random [cogito] notes

Philosophy Book: The Metaphysics of Free Will

2007-11-22T02:19:22Z

Bought Nov. 20, 2007. I'll be surprised if I finish it within the next two years. I don't know why I buy all these books. Well, I know why. It's an addiction. The question is whether or not I'll ever get around to reading them all.

Mlodinow's 'Feynman's Rainbow'

2007-08-27T01:53:50Z

Feinman's Rainbow: A Search for Beauty in Physics and Life

A fantastic read. Inspirational. Mlodinow documents his short, but powerful relationship with Richard Feynman and how some of their discussions deeply impacted his life. It is a relatively quick read, but packed with information and stimulus that I would read again.

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Feynman Lectures: A Photon's Weight

2007-08-20T03:22:31Z

So on p. 2-10, Feynman says that a photon has zero mass and this means that (by nature of a particle that has no mass) it cannot be at rest. So a photon is defined as a particle that always moves at 186kmph. Amazing...

I quoteth Feynman

2007-08-19T01:00:00Z

“You might ask why we cannot teach physics by just giving the basic laws on page on and then showing how they work in all possible circumstances, as we do in Euclidean geometry, where we state the axioms and then make all sorts of deductions. (So, not satisfied to learn physics in four years, you want to learn it in four minutes?) We cannot do it in this way for two reasons. First, we do not yet know all the basic laws: there is an expanding frontier of ignorance...” (1-1 Feynman, Feynman Lectures in Physics: Volume I)

How refreshing. We don't and are not coming close to knowing everything. In fact, if you take the above seriously, for every answer we find, more questions are discovered.

Aquinas on Aristotle: Beginning Discussion of Substance

2007-04-16T03:58:14Z

Another feature in Aristotle's Metaphysics that has me continually confused is the entire discussion of substance. For me, the discussion seems redundant, because I don't see a logical difference between the (modern) concept of being and substance. (My idea of substance - again, in the modern sense - is not substance-as-object, but substance-as-physical-phenomena. And the physical phenomena are real things that we can know through immediate sense or scientific observation.)
Finally, thought, with the help of Aquinas (Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics 434), I am better grasping substance as Aristotle means it: substance is that on which we predicate qualities and spacial attribute. Furthermore, matter is an item that is left over when all of the sensible attributes have been removed from a given substance. It is hard to understand Aristotle's conception of matter in light of modern physics (I'm sure anyone reading this 100 years from now will laugh at modern) because for us, there is no such thing as matter without sensible attribute. For Aristotle, though, matter appears to be an empty shell that, when joined with form, becomes something sensible.
The following lines helped make all of this clear:

"For if the other attributes, which clearly are not substance, are taken away from sensible bodies, in which substance is clearly apparent, it seems that the only thing which remains is matter." (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1281 or p. 434)

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The [aristotelian] view of infinite flux/change

2007-04-15T20:39:49Z

In many ways, I was curious to see how Aristotle would argue against Heraclitus's view that there are not any permanent things in the world, as the world is only of change and about change (in my words, everything is in an infinite flux). The following from Politis never occurred to me:

"But his response here (in IV. 5-6) to phenomenalism, and in particular to the view that all things are radically changing and radically indeterminate, consists largely in his stating his opposing views about all things and about changing things in particular (see 1010a15-35), and that although things may constantly change in virtually every way, there is a crucial way in which they are changeless: things are changeless in respect of their form (eidos, 1010a22-25)." (Politis 166)

While I'm guessing that one does not have to buy into Aristotle's theory of existence (matter, form, telos and movement) - I don't know because I haven't thought too much about it - it is true that in order to have sensible conversation about objects - even if they are constantly changing - there must be a core sameness within that object to make it discernible and describable.

Technorati Tags: aristotle, metaphysics, change, vasilis politis

PNC (Aristotle) as a defence for being

2007-04-13T03:38:25Z

So, in Politis Ch. 6, Sec. 8, we start to see the way in which being will function via particulars and their existence. The fact that we can only really speak of actual things, and not indeterminate objects lends to the notion that being is conceptually justified via objects having sensible, specific nature. In terms of the PNC, this specific, sensible nature is by way of something being x and not both x and not-x. (What has yet to clear the cobwebs of my mind is the explanation of objects that are in it of themselves and not dependent upon a more primary object for its existence.

Technorati Tags: aristotle, metaphysics, pnc, being

PNC and quantum mechanics - mathematical versus sensible realities

2007-04-09T01:06:59Z

Is it possible to accept PNC as Aristotle states it and yet deal with the consequences that quantum states may have on the PNC? Perhaps a way around the problem of the PNC and quantum mechanics - specifically Schrödinger's Cat - is to say that the PNC deals with immediately sensible things and the epistemological effects thereof, whereas quantum mechanic's description of a quantum state is a mathematical reality that collapses when we try to observe it. In other words, there is no problem believing the reality of the paradox of a photon having both positive and negative spin before specific observation and still agreeing that it is not possible for one and the same thing both to have and not to have one and the same property at the same time.
Is this a slippery way away from having an example of a true contradiction - i.e. argument against PNC?

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PNC and 'principles of reasoning'

2007-04-08T21:51:08Z

In explaining where the PNC fits in our study of metaphysics, Aristotle makes clear that general 'principles of reasoning' or, axioms, belong to science in general and are not part of a specific science (in saying this, he must be implying that metaphysics is a type of unifying science, above all others). Thus, because the PNC is a general condition and statement about knowledge - or understanding being - it must be part of our study of metaphysics.

"The grounds for thinking that the examination does not belong to a specialized science, is that principles of reasoning, such as PNC, are true of all things, not just some things; and this is confirmed by the fact that everyone and all sciences make use of them." (Politis [digital] Ch. 5, Sec. 4)

Technorati Tags: aristotle, being, logic, metaphysics, PNC

PNC and 'natural' thought

2007-04-08T21:50:46Z

"But how can a principle of reasoning, which is apparently about thought, be true not so much because of the nature of thought, but because of the nature of things?" (Politis [digital] Ch. 5, Sec. 4)

I wrote in my notes that the PNC can be true because of the 'nature of things' (as Politis puts it) because Aristotle is focused on the way we can know primary 'things' through our contemplation of the sensible world. (It is not mere contemplation of sensible things that leads us to this conclusion, but logic, thought, study and eventually wisdom - all based upon the types of conclusions we can reach about knowable things.)

Technorati Tags: aristotle, being, metaphysics, philosophy, PNC, primary principles

Engaging in Metaphysical discourse forces recognition of PNC

2007-04-07T17:24:04Z

To quote Politis:

"Aristotle's examination and defense of PNC occupies a pivotal position in the Metaphysics. He argues, on the one hand, that PNC is a necessary condition for the possibility of thought and language; but, on the other hand, that PNC is true of the things themselves and of things without qualification, it is not only and not primarily true of things in so far as we can think and speak of things. But it will emerge that the upshot of his overall argument is this: we must engage in metaphysics, i.e. in the project of asking 'What is being?' and 'What is primary being?', and we must search for an answer to these questions, if we at all want to consider how thought and language are possible. So, ultimately, the aim of the examination of PNC is to provide vital motivation for engaging in his own overall project, i.e. metaphysics as he conceives it - indeed to show that this project is, in a way, inescapable."

If I understand this correctly, this means that engaging in metaphysics entails thinking about and/or discussing the PNC.

Technorati Tags: aristotle, metaphysics, philosophy, PNC, vasilis politis

Are there really principles

2007-04-07T16:53:49Z

Are there really principles of logic that aren't demonstrable? If we can demonstrate situations where principles are required for logical outcomes to apply, then doesn't it show that one has just demonstrated that a given principle is so? I realize that in light of the view that induction fails because the future can always disprove a concept (especially given that we are not infallible and that premises that seem so obvious now, may later prove to be wrong), a principle is so because it is demonstrable in the here and now (and may never be proven wrong). Reading RPG A MP Politis Ch 5, Sec. 3.

Technorati Tags: aristotle, metaphysics

PNC is a principle of being

2007-04-07T05:16:15Z

According to Politis, Aristotle enjoys a view of PNC that relates to a local view of a subject. Not only do we apply the PNC to real things and eventually primary being, but it is strongly defensible when we are talking about things of the senses (further defending a materialist driven view of being and scientific discovery).

Aristotle and the Principle of non-Contradiction

2007-04-06T23:53:47Z

Isn't the PNC obvious? Unless you don't believe in the reality of time and change, how could one argue that two opposing predicates are part of the same subject at the same time? I'm sure there are some arguments about quantum states that disprove this, but in my estimation, while quantum states are real, their explanation in terms of traditional thought about the state of a photon. I don't know how to flesh this out, but something troubles me about having to prove a concept that seems relatively logical from the get-go.

Catalano: Thinking Matter; reducible to quantity (or not)

2007-04-06T20:35:17Z

In talking about matters of reality - matters of experience - that can or cannot be reduced to quantity (by quantity, I think he is referring to quantitative analysis), then in the world outside of our mind, it cannot be reduced to quantity. Therefore, things are, as we see them.