In many ways, I was curious to see how Aristotle would argue against Heraclitus's view that there are not any permanent things in the world, as the world is only of change and about change (in my words, everything is in an infinite flux). The following from Politis never occurred to me:
"But his response here (in IV. 5-6) to phenomenalism, and in particular to the view that all things are radically changing and radically indeterminate, consists largely in his stating his opposing views about all things and about changing things in particular (see 1010a15-35), and that although things may constantly change in virtually every way, there is a crucial way in which they are changeless: things are changeless in respect of their form (eidos, 1010a22-25)." (Politis 166)
While I'm guessing that one does not have to buy into Aristotle's theory of existence (matter, form, telos and movement) - I don't know because I haven't thought too much about it - it is true that in order to have sensible conversation about objects - even if they are constantly changing - there must be a core sameness within that object to make it discernible and describable.
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